Ī	1	1
1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS	
2	TEXARKANA DIVISION	
3	HITACHI MAXELL, LTD.	
4	DOCKET NO. 5:16cv178	
5	-vs-) Texarkana, Texas	
6	HUAWEI DEVICE USA INC.,) 2:01 p.m. ET AL September 27, 2017	
7	MDANGGDIDM OF HEADING ON MOMION MO DIGMIGG	
8	TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING ON MOTION TO DISMISS BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROBERT W. SCHROEDER III, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE	
9		
10	<u>A P P E A R A N C E S</u>	
11	FOR THE PLAINTIFF:	
12		
13	MR. JAMIE B. BEABER MAYER BROWN LLP	
14	350 South Grand Ave., 25th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071-1503	
15	MR. JAMES A. FUSSELL III (TRIPP)	
16	MAYER BROWN LLP 1999 K Street, NW	
17	Washington, DC 20006-1101	
18	MR. GEOFFREY P. CULBERTSON PATTON TIDWELL & CULBERTSON, LLP 4605 Texas Blvd.	
19	P.O. Box 5398 Texarkana, TX 75505-5398	
20	Texarrana, Tx 75505-5590	
21	COURT REPORTER: MS. SHEA SLOAN, CSR, RPR OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER	
22	211 W. Ferguson	
23	Tyler, TX 75702 shea_sloan@txed.uscourts.gov	
24	Proceedings taken by Machine Stenotype; transcript was	
25	produced by a Computer.	

```
1
     FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
2
     MR. STANLEY YOUNG
 3
     MR. ANUPAM SHARMA
     COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
     333 Twin Dolphin Dr.
 4
     Ste. 700
 5
     Redwood Shores, CA 94065-1418
6
     MR. GREGORY S. NIEBERG
7
     COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
     The New York Times Building
8
     620 Eighth Avenue
     New York, NY 10018-1405
 9
10
     MS. JENNIFER PARKER AINSWORTH
11
     WILSON ROBERTSON & CORNELIUS
     900 ESE Loop 323
     Ste. 400
12
     P.O. Box 7339
     Tyler, TX 75711-7339
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

1 PROCEEDINGS 2 THE COURT: Please be seated. 3 Mrs. Schroeder, if you would, call the case for us. 4 THE CLERK: Cause No. 5:16cv178, Hitachi Maxwell, Ltd. vs. Huawei Device USA Inc., et al. 5 THE COURT: Announcements for the record. 6 7 MR. CULBERTSON: Your Honor, Geoff Culbertson. I'm here today with Tripp Fussell and Jamie Beaber from Mayer 8 Brown in Washington DC. And we are ready. 9 10 THE COURT: Very well. Thank you, Mr. Culbertson. 11 Welcome. 12 Ms. Ainsworth. 13 MS. AINSWORTH: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Jennifer Ainsworth, Stanley Young, Anupam Sharma, and Greg 14 15 Nieberg for the Huawei Defendants. And we are ready to proceed. 16 17 THE COURT: Good. Very well. Thank you, Ms. 18 Ainsworth. 19 We are here on Huawei's motion to dismiss related 20 to the '139 and '292 patent, and I think the parties are in 21 general agreement that an hour per side will be an adequate 22 amount of time to cover all of the issues we need to cover. 23 So, perhaps, we will take a break before rebuttal, 24 so Huawei may proceed. 25 MS. AINSWORTH: Your Honor, if I may approach.

THE COURT: Yes.

(Slides distributed.)

MR. YOUNG: Thank you very much, Your Honor. Good afternoon. Stanley Young for the Defendants Huawei.

We have a case here that is very much like ones that the Court has considered over the last year -- or the last six months actually, involving the Alice Step 1 and Step 2 analysis under Section 101.

Both of the patents in this case involve the gathering and calculating and grouping and otherwise dealing with processing information. That is an abstract idea under the Federal Circuit decisions Electric Power, Digitech, and others.

Those ideas are applied in these patents in a specific technological context, but that does not make them patentable subject matter.

Under Alice Step 2, there is no inventive concept.

As we will see, the patents and their claims recite

conventional cellular handsets, GPS devices, central

processing units, and other standard computer components that

are used in a conventional way. There is no unconventional

use of those components and, therefore, no inventive concept.

The inventive concept that the Plaintiff seeks to point to is simply the abstract idea. They say that it is an arrangement of those components in a way that is

unconventional; but the components themselves and the way they are used, the way they receive signals that they have always received, is not inventive and is totally conventional.

It is a fundamental practice of human endeavor to gather and process information. A fundamental principle of the 101 Alice line of cases is that you don't want to preempt people from adopting technological improvements in those areas.

Both of these patents don't introduce -- neither of these patents introduces any technological improvement. They are simply boxes that describe functions and goals. And under that, the principle that has been set forth in the cases in this area that makes them unpatentable subject matter.

We will go through the patents. I will talk a little bit about the law in greater detail, and then go through each patent to see how that law results in the invalidity or the unpatented unpatentability of these patents.

The '292 patent basically involves combining two data sources. As outlined in red on the figure in front of you, Your Honor, the 200, 201, and 204 elements gather GPS-related information on position and the reliability of that position information.

300, 302, and 305 gather cellular-related position information and information on the reliability of that cellular position information.

That information then gets fed into 400, which is the GPS/cellular positioning results combining unit.

Figure 2 of the patent just is a flow chart of those same operations. There is receipt and calculation of the information from the cellular and GPS receivers that gets put into step 606, which is combining those pieces of information in accordance with their weight, which leads to an output.

Now, the patent explicitly says that there is no order required in these operations. So these could be done in some different order than what is shown in Figure 2.

There are two claims in the patent that reflect exactly the steps that are shown in these diagrams. You have the receiver, position calculation, and reliability calculation means elements in Claim 1 for GPS outlined in pink there.

Then in yellow you have very similar analogous means elements for the cellular information. That gets fed into the GPS/cellular combining means, which is in the blue there on the right.

Claim 2, unlike Claim 1, is a method claim.

Claim 1 is a means-plus-function element. Claim 2 is a

method claim. But the scope is pretty much exactly the same except for one minor difference relating to simultaneity of calculation at the end. But you will see there the functions -- the steps, rather, that are cited in Claim 2 precisely map on to the alleged structural elements of Claim 1.

The '139 patent involves a similar processing of information relating to base stations. Here in what is shaded in gray -- and we will provide you, Your Honor, with these hard copies of this presentation -- in 101 of Figure 1, you have the classification of base stations into multiple groups. In Figure 3A those are called G1, G2, and G3.

Then you have obtaining communication quality indices from each of the base stations. That is simply some indication of the quality of the communication.

In Figure 3A the example is receive power, so how much power is being received in connection with that base station. And you have that in yellow.

Then you calculate characterizing quantities of the communication quality for each group. That is step 103 in Figure 1 as shown in pink in that figure and in the figures 3A, B, and C.

There you have a group score that is calculated for each of the groups. So for group G1, for example, you take the received power R1 and R2 and you calculate a group score,

which is designated as S1.

As shown in Figures 3B and C, you could calculate that group score either by adding the scores of the individual base stations or averaging the scores of the individual base stations. But the key is you simply have a group score that is taken from the individual base station scores.

The next step in blue, 104 and 105, is specifying one group in accordance with those group scores.

So just to take an example, you could pick the group with the highest group score. And then in 105 of Figure 1 you specify one base station in that group.

Claim 1 maps on to that diagram. The first step is obtaining the information about the individual base stations. Step 2 is calculating the group scores. And step 3 is taking one of the base stations from one of the groups that you have selected, based on those characterizing quantities.

There are some apparatus claims as well. Claim 11 recites the same steps in the context of a control unit.

There is also a storage unit there that is also not convention -- is also conventional.

There is some dependent claims that specify the particular communication quality index to be used. Excuse me. So you have receive power, which is what is in Figure 3. You have communication bit rate. You have SNR value, which

is signal to noise ratio, which measures the noise and quality of the signal.

Then you have more generic metrics of wireless communication that are referred to in other claims. And you have a prior art positioning method which doesn't add anything either. That is just using the signals and the time between sending and receipt, which is sort of like, you know, people have done that for ages. It is like radar, and that doesn't add anything to the claims either.

So the question is, given this set of disclosures of the claims, what should be the outcome under Alice in Section 101? I think the Court is very familiar with the two-step Alice process, abstract idea and inventive concept. And I will discuss each of those here.

The key here is the fact that manipulation of data -- excuse me -- is not a patentable concept. It is an abstract idea. The Electric Power case is a very good one, and I will give you some detail on that in a bit. But really these claims just deal with and are completely directed to organizing, displaying, and manipulating data.

Now, in their briefing, Plaintiff says that we have characterized that in different ways. I don't think so. If you look at all of the ways we have characterized it, it is the same thing as what we are saying now, it's organizing, displaying, and manipulating data.

Step 2 of Alice requires something significantly more than the abstract idea. In order to show entitlement to a patent, the patent owner must demonstrate that the claims feature something beyond routine and conventional activities.

And it can't just be insignificant extra-solution activity. It has to be something that allows the Court to be comfortable that the abstract idea is not being preempted. Simply placing the abstract idea and using it in a particular technological environment, limiting it to cell phones say, does not suffice to make an abstract idea patentable.

In particular in this case we have generic computer elements such as CPUs, storage memories, and other elements such as GPS receivers, cellular receivers that are being used in their conventional, traditional, generic way. And that does not create patentable subject matter.

Plaintiff has submitted some expert declarations. For the reasons that we cited in our brief, we believe the Court should ignore those.

THE COURT: Wait. Can you remind me exactly what specific reasons you gave in your brief for ignoring those?

I mean, why is expert testimony inappropriate to support an argument like this?

MR. YOUNG: The patents can be read. They are part of the pleading. Generally, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings or a motion to dismiss, the Court need not consider

extrinsic evidence. Those expert declarations are interpretations. They are extrinsic evidence. So I believe the Court can and should ignore them.

Should the Court choose to consider them, we certainly dispute the merits of them. They don't really talk about the unconventionality of the components that are in the case. They focus on the alleged unconventionality of the abstract ideas that are stated in both of these patents. So both procedurally and substantively they should not be considered.

Going to the '292 patent and, again, here are the claims. The abstract idea is combining the two data sources that is manipulating the data based on their reliability.

And here I think it is quite useful to compare the claims of the '292 to the claim in the Electric Power case.

Excuse me, Your Honor.

As you will see, the Electric Power case involved a claim that called for receiving data. And this is about an electric power grid. This is true technology, and involved a lot of detail about how electric power grids work, and it involved a lot of data from an electric power grid.

Detecting and analyzing events in real time from that data, accumulating and updating the measurements from that data, and then deriving a composite indicator of reliability based on that data, that is very similar to the

claim of the '292 patent. And I believe that the result for the '292 patent should be the same.

The Digitech case is also very similar. The claim in that case was for generating a device profile, which calls for generating sets of data and then combining those sets of data into a device profile. That is exactly the kind of data manipulation and combination that we have in the '292 patent.

As Digitech said back in 2014, simply taking two data sets and combining them into a single data set, is not patentable. It is simply calculating; and even if it is for a specific purpose, even if it is for a beneficial purpose, that by itself does not make the patent eligible under Section 101.

With respect to some other case law here, as you can see from the Electric Power case, even if it is a desirable outcome, the fact that it uses simple combination of data and components that are generic, does not make it patentable.

Just like what the -- happened in TLI

Communications, the patent, as you can see from the figures,
does not provide any technical details for the functions that
are claimed.

Going to Step 2 of Alice, the combination that we have seen, the claims that we have seen, do not involve any

inventive concepts. We have cellular communications, cell phones just receiving signals, and we have GPS components that are doing the same thing. They calculate positions just as this Court found in the Rothschild case.

The background section of the '292 patent emphasizes the non -- that -- the lack of something unconventional in these claims. It talks about how in the past, and this is the background of the convention -- of the patent, rather, in Column 1 starting at Line 13, how mobile handsets have used GPS and how cellular networks have been used in connection with GPS.

The patent itself further details how the claims do not add inventive concepts. You will see there in the middle of the first paragraph that is starting at Column 2, Line 38, that it relies on elements that are well-known. And it certainly is not limited to any new or unconventional elements or arrangement of elements. And it seeks to sweep in parts and orientations that are conventional.

Going to the GPS status sources. The description in Column 2 starting at Line 51 talks about GPS parts of this claim in a way that is no different from the way that GPS equipment has been used.

As this Court found in the Rothschild case, a GPS device performing such generic tasks does not create patentable subject matter.

Going to the cellular side, it is really the same thing. Down at the bottom of Column 2 and top of Column 3, the discussion there is of a receiver and a mobile handset receiving and calculating its positions using cellular signals. There is nothing unconventional there.

When you get to the combining element, Figure 3 of the patent discloses a use of a weighted average formula. And there you simply take the location for GPS and the location for the cell network, which consists of X and Y coordinates, you multiply them by the weights, respectively, of the GPS and cellular, that is the Wgps and Wcell, and you created a weighted average of the coordinates, and that is just manipulating data. And it is not manipulating data in any new way. People have been using weighted averages for a variety of purposes forever.

So those concrete, tangible components, while they are concrete, are not new. They are totally conventional.

They are well-understood, standard in the industry, and therefore, this is not patentable.

This Court itself in cases like Uniloc vs. Amazon has emphasized that the traditional arrangement of computer components distinguishes this case from others where patentable subject matter has been found.

The file history emphasizes this point as well. The Patent Office had found that the Watters patent had

anticipated the claims as originally submitted, and it was only the addition of the simultaneity elements which led to the patent being issued. We believe that was an error; and that the patent, obviously, is not distinct from the prior art. But that is what the Patent Office said.

The issue of claim construction has been argued, that the Court should defer until after claim construction its decision on that motion. We believe that to be wrong. Since the briefing in the case, the parties have submitted a joint claim construction and prehearing statement. And the claim construction positions set forth in that document actually support our motion.

Here are several of Plaintiff's alleged -- or proposed claim constructions for elements of Claim 1.

And what they claim there as the structure -- and under 112(6) the structure helps define the claim, there are processors such as CPUs that are used to accomplish the goals that are set forth in the patent.

A CPU is a general computer component. It can do different things if it is programmed, obviously. But it is really a general generic component that does not lend inventive concept to an abstract idea. The case law is very clear that you can't just say, well, let's take a computer and have it do these things and have that be a patentable subject matter. That is just not the case.

The other thing is that these claim constructions don't present any issues that would change the result on the Alice issue one way or the other.

The simultaneity element similarly does not cause the Court to have to defer its decision on this issue. Both of the parties agree that that term should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, so there is nothing really that turns on simultaneity.

Moving now to the '139 patent, here again, we have another set of claims that simply collects, calculates, and issues an output based on that calculation of data.

That is not sufficiently technological. It is not like Enfish where the computer's operation itself is being improved. There are no structural components other than processors and general networks and storage units that are recited in the claims that make this a patentable subject matter.

Actually, both in the '139 and the '292, there is no particular way of programming or designing the software to accomplish this claimed functionality. And, therefore, for that reason, as well as this Court noted in Uniloc vs. AVG, these claims do not cite patentable subject matter.

I think a key disclosure of the '139 patent appears at the top of Column 6, which states, quote: The wireless communication function and the base station selection

algorithm are implemented by executing the software stored in the RAM by the CPU. RAM is completely conventional memory.

The CPU is a completely generic computer component. They may in any case that we might look at, be programmed to do different things; but that does not make an abstract idea patentable.

There is nothing unusual in the arrangement of the RAM or the CPU. There is nothing claimed about how they are somehow situated differently. The only claim here is that they do different things in accordance with this allegedly novel abstract idea. And that does not make that abstract idea patentable.

So the claims here just talk about, again, the collection, analysis, and display of available information. They don't specify a particular way of doing that. The elements recited are generic; receiving, identifying, processing, combining information. And those recitations do not create anything that can be patented.

There are some additional claims, Claims 7, 8, and 9, for example, that specify the particular category of information that is used to select a base station within a particular group.

But as this case, this Court noted, again, in one of the Uniloc cases, Uniloc vs. Amazon, a claim that limits the calculation to a particular kind of data does not suffice

to raise an abstract idea to the level of something that is patentable.

You can have an abstract idea and then recite independent claims, well, it is used on that kind of information, that kind of information, but it is all data. Under Electric Power and Digitech, it is all data. And regardless of what kind of data is specified to be manipulated or used, that does not rise to the level of patentability.

A couple of claims relate to a terminal positioning method which uses the abstract idea. That is an insignificant post-solution activity. Again, it is like radar. It is using a signal and when it is sent and when it is received and the time that it takes to implement an abstract idea; and that, again, is completely conventional and does not rise to the level of a patentable claim.

Claim construction, here again, for the '139 patent, does not make a difference. The parties have actually agreed on the index of communication quality. That is what is characterized as an individual base station. The differences between the party on the characterizing quantities element, which we regard as the group score element, and that is what is shown in the figure, also really doesn't make a difference here.

Under either construction what is being manipulated

simply is data, data that is taken from a bunch of components of a group in order to create a characterizing quantity for the group as a whole. That, under the cases we have cited, does not create any patentable subject matter.

For those reasons, Your Honor, we believe that

Counts II and IV of this complaint should be dismissed. I am

happy to answer any questions or reserve the remainder of my

time for rebuttal.

THE COURT: Yeah, thank you, Mr. Young. I know you are addressing the '139 there; and on the claim construction issue, I would like to ask you with respect to it, as well as the '292 patent, you know, I frequently have movants in 101 motions say: You know, just assume, for the purposes of argument, the non-movant's or the Plaintiff's proposed claim construction, and we still win on 101.

So I am wondering -- I'm curious, is that a position that you are willing to take here? I am not familiar -- other than what you have just described this afternoon, I am not fully familiar with, you know, the constructions that the parties have exchanged. I know we have a Markman that is set in a couple of months. But what are your thoughts about that?

MR. YOUNG: We would certainly be willing to accept the Plaintiff's claim construction solely for the purposes of decision on this case. As I said, it makes no difference.

And the only way we can argue that is to say if you assume they are right on that, we win. And we do believe we do win.

Just going back to the '292 constructions, just to focus on that for a moment, accepting the Plaintiff's constructions, which we do believe to be wrong, but assuming we accept them for this motion, actually assists us on this motion.

And for -- the reason for that is, that for several of the elements, as you can see with respect to the GPS reliability calculation means and then the combining means, they say that the disclosure includes a CPU. That is a general central processing unit. It could be programmed in many different ways.

The fact that they say that that is a disclosed structure with respect to these claim elements, indicates that under their own claim construction these are completely conventional elements and should not be patentable because you can't say, do it on a computer and have it be patentable.

Now, we do happen to disagree that a CPU is disclosed. With the diagrams and the discussion of the -- in the specification, in our view, do not disclose a CPU. So we think that they are wrong in that. But assuming that they are right, I believe that actually supports our 101 motion.

THE COURT: Okay. Then this question is also sort of related to claim construction, and I guess given that

answer, it is somewhat of an academic question. But there is a standard that the Plaintiff's claim, I think, in their surreply that, you know, whether claim construction could affect the analysis is kind of the dispositive issue. Do you agree with that, or do you think the standard is higher?

MR. YOUNG: I think they need to demonstrate something about the claim construction that could make a difference. Now, granted, I do want time to rebut because we haven't had any briefing since the claim constructions; but at least my view of the claim constructions, is that they don't show anything that could possibly make a difference with respect to this Alice issue.

THE COURT: Okay. And then, finally, they contend that I think in the early 2000s the mobile handsets and receiver means were not generic. Would you address that?

MR. YOUNG: I don't think that is true. You know, they actually in their briefing talk about how they did these patents or their predecessors did these patents prior to the iPhone. That isn't relevant in this case, and I don't believe it is true.

The '292 specification, for example, explicitly states the state of the art with respect to cellular components and GPS components, and I think that the -- for example, going back to Column 2 and Column 5 starting at lines -- actually Column 1 starting at Line 13, it talks

explicitly in the patent about -- and this is the background of the patent -- about GPS systems, how they have been used in practical applications such as car navigation. And they talk about how in conjunction with a method using GPS, a cellular telephone network is used to notify a handset of auxiliary information for receiving radio waves for GPS.

So the elements that are described in the '292 patent, the cellular and GPS elements are not new and were conventional.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Young.

MR. YOUNG: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. FUSSELL: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. FUSSELL: I'm just going to switch this over here.

May it please the Court. Tripp Fussell on behalf of the Plaintiffs Hitachi Maxwell. Your Honor, what I would like to start off by pointing out here is that, as the Plaintiff -- as the Defendants' own argument has pointed out, this -- this is -- this issue here presented by the Defendants is premature.

Essentially, what I heard the Defendants say and what they have argued in their briefs is that this is just a combination of conventional components in each of the patents that don't perform any new, non-conventional element.

But the issue of whether or not a combination of conventional elements is patentable or not, is an issue of validity, you know, which we point out in our reply.

Essentially, what the Defendants argue in here is a question of obviousness. You know, it was obvious to combine all of these conventional components to perform the function that we have claimed. But that is an issue for novelty, not an issue of eligibility.

In addition -- and the Court pointed out this as well, is the issues of claim construction. Claim construction, you know, under Markman defines the scope of the claims, what the inventors claimed as their invention.

So it is -- it is imperative to know what the scope of the claims are before we can say whether or not they are eligible for patentability, so we think it is premature from the standpoint of the Court should've construed the claims in advance.

Now, to the point of whether they will accept our construction or not, you know, we think under our construction it actually points out, you know, even makes our case stronger that the claims are eligible for patentability. We will make that point here as well.

What I would like to start off with is kind of backing up. You know, they describe the -- what the patent is and what it is directed to, and I think we pretty much

agree for the most part that it is directed to a method or apparatus for determining of the '292, that is, the position of the mobile device using GPS and cellular signals.

The invention calculates the location of the GPS and cellular signals. It estimates the reliability of each of those signals, and then it combines those to determine location of the device.

Now, I remind the Court that this was in 2001. This was before everybody was walking around with a device in their hand that did all of this information. This was eight years before the first iPhone came out that even had GPS capabilities.

The inventors here foresaw the issues that they were -- people were going to eventually incorporate this location information and need that information to determine their location; but they saw the problems with that, with using GPS alone.

For example, Your Honor, with the traditional like just the Garmin or TomTom device back in the day you might, you know, be out in the open and be able to get, you know, six satellite signals, and it can pinpoint your position down to the foot, you know. And you might be in a position where with a cellular device you are in, you know, an urban area where you can get numerous cell towers and triangulate your position based on a plethora of cell towers to pinpoint your

location.

But in certain situations, and inventors saw this, you know, you may not be able to get a GPS satellite signal or maybe you can only get one GPS satellite signal; and, therefore, you know, you get two satellite signals, for example, that can't pinpoint your location, and that device is telling you you are 200 feet away or you are on top of a mountain. We all remember that from back in the day.

Or maybe you are inside of a building where you can't receive signals at all, and you can't get any GPS data, how does it determine your location?

Well, looking to cellular to correct that problem, you can actually triangulate your position based on cellular towers. But let's say you are out in a very rural area where you only have a single cell tower and there is no -- or you have no service whatsoever, if you are relying on that alone, you can see that you are not able to determine your position at all.

They saw these problems back in 2001 before anybody was actually using these -- years and years before anybody was actually using these in a mobile device that everybody carried around with them, they foresaw these issues. And they decided that, you know, look, if we take GPS and we take cellular, we not only take that information and combine it to determine the position; but we first check the reliability of

that information.

Maybe that GPS signal that I am getting is only based on one satellite. It is not very reliable. But the cellular data that I am getting does have multiple cell towers, and it is more reliable, and I shouldn't discredit or reduce the reliability of that GPS signal when I combine the two to actually determine the location of the device.

And they do this simultaneously. It is not getting one set of data and the other set of data and then later combining those in some fashion. It is doing this all miraculously right there on your device right in one instance.

If we look to the claims of the '292 patent, it talks about a GPS receiver means, a GPS position calculation means, a GPS reliability calculation means, cellular receiver means, cellular position calculation means, cellular reliability calculation means -- excuse me -- and a GPS/cellular position result combination means.

Now, if we look to the Figure 1, you can see that this is how the information was brought in. Through a single antenna or through an antenna means, the 100, the device receives cellular or GPS information.

The GPS information enters into a GPS receiver block 200. That is then processed and the position of the -- based on the GPS data is determined. Then the invention

describes testing the reliability of that information and doing the same from the cellular data down at block 300, 301, and 304.

And then in block 400 it actually takes that information and combines it in this new and non-obvious way to determine the position of that device.

Similarly, the '139 patent is directed to a method and apparatus for wireless terminal or mobile handsets to select a base station from a plurality of base stations according to the communication services that are offered by the wireless terminal, the communication quality required.

Again, this was back in 2005, your Honor. The inventors foresaw the problems associated with wireless terminals selecting base stations regardless of the needs of the device.

Essentially, what the devices were doing is just determining what cellular tower is giving me the most powerful signal and then selecting that -- of multiple cell towers, selecting the ones that give me the most power.

But in some instances cell towers are grouped in a certain fashion, and maybe -- you know, even though I am receiving a high power in one -- from one satellite tower, I may -- that group itself may have a lot of bandwidth being taken up, for example, by multiple users.

For example, a cell tower at your neighbor's house

that lives next to a Safeway, it also is in a group of cell towers that actually have a lot of bandwidth being used because that Safeway has so many users in there that are using their phones.

So that -- when you group those cell towers together, that quality of the service provided from that group is not as high as maybe that single cell tower that your phone is receiving a power signal from.

So what the inventors came up with is an idea for actually categorizing the quality of the service within a group of services, indexing that quality, and then selecting from the group the single cell tower to be used within that group.

So, for example, if you select one that has -- you want to watch movies on your phone, for example, that require a very high bandwidth, you want to get into a group of cell towers that can actually provide that bandwidth across the entire group, so that if you jump from one tower to the next you don't see disruptions in your service. So when you are watching your movie at your neighbor's house and you switch over to another tower that has a bunch of people at the Safeway using that same tower, you don't see disruptions in your movie watching capabilities.

The '139 patent claims directed to a first step of obtaining an index of communication quality between the

terminal and the base stations, the second step of calculating the characteristic qualities of the communication qualities for each group; that is, it determines the entire group's total group score, as the Defendants pointed out, and a step of specifying one of the plurality of groups based on the characterizing quantities and selecting one of the base stations.

So from that, as I described, it selects, based on the characterizing qualities of that group, a single base station to connect to for the device.

In looking at the diagram from Figure 2, the patent describes instances where, for example, base station 201 and 203 are in a single -- are in a group of base stations.

So like I previously discussed, if 201 and 203 are in a group and 202 and 204 are in a group, and 201 provides a very strong signal, so my device can read from 201 that that signal is strong; therefore, I want to connect to that signal.

But if you combine 201 and 203, you see that the group score, the group -- or the total power that is output by that group is actually kind of small. Whereas, the combined output of 202 and 204, though maybe neither one of them individually is higher than 201, together as a group they provide much -- much stronger signal. And, therefore, my device would connect to that group instead, so that I know

if I jump from 202 to 204 I will see minimal disruption.

And, of course, as the Court is well aware, the Alice Supreme Court provided the two-part test, whether the claim is issued directed to one of the patent's ineligible concepts such as abstract idea. If so, whether the claim has an inventive concept, an element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice -- practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself.

One thing important to note here is that in Alice the Supreme Court struck a delicate balance between trying -- to tying up fundamental building blocks of innovation while not swallowing up patent law as a whole, rightly explaining that all inventions at some level embody abstract ideas, laws of nature, or natural phenomenon.

As pointed out in this slide here in the quote from the Alice decision: We have repeatedly emphasized this concern that patent law not inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of these building blocks of human ingenuity. At the same time, we tread carefully to construe this exclusionary principle, lest to swallow all patent law as a whole.

Therefore, the Courts in applying 101 must distinguish between patents that claim the building blocks of human ingenuity and those that simply integrate those

building blocks to come up with something new and non-obvious.

It is our position that is, in fact, what the inventors of the '292 and the one three patent -- '139 patent have done here.

The claims of the '292 patent did not attempt to monopolize every potential solution for combining two data sources based on their reliability.

The claims are directed to solving a specific problem of locating a mobile device.

The claims require specific data sources, GPS and cellular data signals.

The claims require specific ways of combining that data, applying a reliability estimate before combining the two.

The specification discloses concrete examples of how reliability is calculated and how the data sources are combined to get their location.

Taking that a step further, Your Honor. It is important to look at the fact that this patent is not preempting any building blocks. You know, if you look at the claims of the '292 patent, it is not preventing the use of GPS to get position information. It is not preempting the use of cellular signals to determine calculations. The claims do not preempt the determination of reliability of GPS

signals.

It is not preempting any fundamental building blocks. It is not preventing anybody else from using those that are well-known devices. What it has done is combined conventional, if you will, in a non-conventional way, in a very new and non-obvious way to address these very specific problems that the inventors foresaw.

The same is true with the '139 patent. The claims of the '139 patent do not preempt or attempt to monopolize every potential solution for selecting a particular object within a group, as the Defendants would have you believe.

The claims are directed to solving a very specific problem. The inventors of the '139 patent saw that there was a problem with simply selecting a base station based on the highest power of the base station that you could find.

The claims are limited to the specific metrics of indexing of communication qualities and characterizing the quantities of the communication quality.

The claims require a specific way of using these metrics, not previously known to a select base station.

Again, even taking it a step further, they do not preempt any building blocks. The claims do not preempt the selection of a base station from a group of base stations.

It doesn't preempt the use of index of communication qualities. It doesn't preempt the use of

characterizing quantities to select a base station.

It doesn't prevent anyone else from using these building blocks, if you will. It only claims them in a very non-conventional way to solve the specific problem that the inventors had identified.

What Huawei does for both of the patents here is they read out the claim elements to a point of abstraction.

They basically do what the Supreme Court warned against in the Alice decision by attempting to generalize the patents to a point of abstraction.

Huawei argues that the claims of the '292 patent are directed to nothing more than a combination -- nothing more than combining two data sources. And the claims of the '139 patent are directed to nothing more than collecting and analyzing data that a wireless terminal uses to select a base station.

However, this creates -- Huawei, however, creates its abstract idea by dismissing all context and claim elements from the patents as conventional or data manipulation.

So, basically, they strip away all of the limitations of the claim and boil down to only their very basics, in an attempt to make this appear as an abstract idea rather than a true invention that it is.

As the Court, I am sure is all too aware, there is

no bright line test that is dictated by the Supreme Court or the Federal Circuit. However, the case law is important, and it establishes some specific guideposts that we can look to to determine what is patent -- what patent eligible -- what is patent eligible and what is not.

First, are the claims directed to an improvement of computer-related functionality? You know, in the Enfish case the Court said that: Claims directed to a specific improvement to the way a computer operates are typically patent eligible. The key question here, whether the focus of the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities or instead on the process that qualifies as an abstract idea.

In this instance, Your Honor, with both the '292 and '139 patent, the claims are an improvement to the computer-related functionality. They were improving the way that a mobile device determines its position by gathering GPS and cellular data, so it was an improvement of that computer-related functionality.

And with respect to the '139 they were also collecting data from multiple base stations to determine the best communication qualities of the group of base stations to better select the base station for that particular device's needs.

So it is our position that at this point you can

decide that these patents are, in fact, an improvement on computer-related technology that makes them entitled to -- eligible for patentability. That is to say, these inventors identified a discrete problem.

They took what was on the shelf for them, these conventional, you know, knowledgeable information that they knew of; but they combined that in a very non-conventional way to solve these discrete problems that they had identified. That is, improving on the computer-related functionality, not simply using a computer to solve a specific problem that you can do by hand, for example.

The second guidepost that we have identified in our briefing, Your Honor, is: Do the claims require more specific hardware than a general purpose computer?

This gets to the point I was just raising. In the Thales case the Court said that: Just as claims directed to a new and useful technique for defining a database that runs on general purpose computer equipment are patent eligible, so too are claims directed to a new and useful technique for using sensors to more effectively track an object on a moving platform.

I will point out the specifics of the Thales case and how they directly line up with the claims here, but I just want to make this point clear is that, you know just -- the mathematical equation is required to complete a claim

element does not doom that patent to ineligibility.

This goes all the way back to Diamond vs. Diehr.

In that case the Supreme Court confirmed the eligibility of patent claims despite the inclusion of a mathematical formula running on a general purpose computer to determine the optimal curing time for rubber tires.

This is because the claims, viewed in their entirety, improved on the prior art molding for tires.

Essentially, what was happening back in the days there was everybody knew how to mold tires, and everybody knew that you had a specific amount of time that was ideal; but they couldn't quite nail it. They couldn't quite nail that time.

So sometimes the curing was a little too long.

Sometimes the curing was a little too short. And when they broke the mold, you know, they weren't quite sure what they were going to get. Even though they could calculate based on the specific mathematical that is claimed in the claims of the patent at issue, in Diehr the Court said that:

Notwithstanding the fact that you are just talking about a general purpose computer running this equation that everybody knows of, you are actually doing it in a very non-conventional way that nobody else was doing before so they can nail that timing just right, in order to break the mold at just the right time.

That is exactly the issue with both the patents in

this case, the '292 patent and the '139. Both are combinations that were non-obvious and entitled to patent eligibility.

The '292 patent claims more. It claims a mobile handset, a GPS/cellular receiver, a GPS/cellular position calculation means, a GPS/cellular reliability calculation means, a GPS/cellular combination means. All of this to combine the positions based on the reliability, which is more than just running a mathematical equation, a weighted average as the Defendants argue, on a general purpose computer.

All of these elements are taken into account when they are receiving the cellular position, receiving the GPS position using those components to determine the position of the device, checking with the reliability means to determine which of those is the most reliable, and then combining those to actually get a very reliable position of the device.

The '139 patent claims require a terminal and a plurality of base stations that exchange information to determine the most appropriate base station. It is more than simply running a mathematical equation on a general purpose computer.

Third, to the extent the claims use data -- this is the third guidepost that we have pointed out from the case law, do they do so to accomplish specific technical ends rather than simply a result? That is to say, as the Court

pointed out in the Electrical Power Group: The critical inquiry is whether the claims merely present the results of data collection or whether there is more to the claims with a specific use of the data or a particular tool. Whether there is more to the claims here than simply just spitting out the results.

For example, with the '292 patent, there is more than just getting data, analyzing the data, and spitting out the positioning. There is collecting GPS data. There is also collecting cellular data. There is using that data to determine the position of the device, then checking the reliability of those positions, and then combining the two, so that I get -- so that I get a better position estimate of the device itself.

That is much more than just simply analyzing, comparing, and spitting out a result, as the Defendants would have you believe.

Another quote here from McRo: We, therefore, look to whether the claims in these patents focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology. They did exactly what the inventors had done here with both the '292 and the '139 patent. They had improved on the relevant technology. They had gone out and identified a specific problem associated with mobile devices, you know, a better way and a more reliable way of calculating my position.

And they sat down, and they said, how are we going to do this better? They come up with this new and non-obvious way of determining the location.

The same is true with respect to selecting the base station from the '139. They actually came up with a technical solution that addressed the problem that they had identified. That, Your Honor, is patent eligible.

The claims pass the first step with respect to the more than a result. As I just noted, Your Honor, I went through these, but the claims recite a way to locate the mobile handset using GPS signals, cellular signals, and estimates of those with respect to their reliability.

These claims are clearly directed to means and methods of producing a certain result rather than the result that it can produce -- or the result produced.

The same is true with respect to the '139 patent.

The claims recite a way of identifying a particular base station. The claims are not directed to specific technical ends not simply a resultant output.

The fourth guidepost that we have identified for Your Honor is in the specific result required by the claim, a concrete solution to the problem.

The Affinity Labs of Texas case, the Federal Circuit pointed out that the representative claims were directed to providing out-of-region access to regional

broadcast content, a broad distribution and familiar concept concerning information distribution that is untethered to a specific or concrete way of implementing it.

The claims simply claimed the function of wireless communication, regional broadcast content to an out-of-region recipient, not a particular way of performing that.

With respect to the '292 and the '139 patent, we do talk about a very particular way of performing a function.

That is what the claims -- you walk by an element-by-element.

Don't strip down all of them to just their basic abstract idea. You have to look at each of the elements claimed in the patents.

And you see that there was a particular way that these inventors came up with an idea for selecting the location of GPS, solving the problem of when you are in a big building and you can't get GPS signals, you can still get your -- you can still get your position. At the same time with locating the best base tower -- the base station, excuse me, locating the best base station, they came up with a very particular way of doing that.

Again, although there is not a bright line test for determining claims, there were two cases in particular that we wanted to point out for Your Honor that are very -- line up very well with the claims of each of the patents.

The first is the Thales case, that I am sure the

Court is aware of. The claims are here. There was a first inertial sensor mounted to a tracking object, a second inertial sensor mounted to a moving reference frame, and an element adapted to receiving signals from said first and second inertial sensors and configured to determine the orientation of the object.

So, essentially, Your Honor, the invention in Thales was a particular configuration of inertial sensors, very conventional at the time this invention was claimed, and a particular method of using the raw data from the sensors in order to more accurately calculate the position of the orientation of the objects on a moving platform.

They said in that case that these claims are eligible. These claims are not merely directed to an abstract idea of using mathematical equations for determining the relative position of a moving object to a moving reference frame. Rather, the claims are directed to systems and methods that use inertial sensors in a non-conventional manner to reduce errors to measure the relative position of the orientation to the moving object.

That is exactly what we have done here. Comparing the two, you see that the Thales takes data from two conventional inertial sensors and combining that data using known mathematics to accurately calculate the position and orientation of an object on a moving platform.

It is exactly, if you will, Your Honor, what the Defendants are arguing is abstract about the '292 patent. We are taking data from two, what they argue are, conventional sensors, GPS and cellular data, determining the reliability of that information obtained, combining that data using known mathematics to accurately calculate the position of the mobile handset device.

A comparison of the claims in Thales against the claims in the '292 patent comes up with no other determination but patent eligibility. If they are eligible in Thales, they have to be eligible for the '292 as well, in our opinion.

In a very recent case that just came out in August from the Federal Circuit, Visual Memories vs. NVIDIA, the claims there are directed to a memory -- a main memory connected to a bus -- very conventional -- a cache connected to said bus -- again, very conventional components -- wherein a programmable operational characteristics of said system determine a type of data stored.

Essentially, the invention there was an enhanced computer memory. And the Court said that the claims focus on a specific asserted improvement to a computer capability.

The use of programmable operational characteristics that are configured based on the type of processor instead of a processor that qualifies as an abstract idea for which the

computers are invoked merely as a tool.

Just like the patents in Enfish and Thales, the specification discussed the advantages offered by the technology improvement. If you will look at the specifications of both the '292 and the '139, they are identifying a very specific problem. And they are coming up with a solution to that problem. That is what our patent system is all about.

Comparing the visual memory invention and what that covered, with the claims of the '139 patent, again, you will see, Your Honor, that if the Visual Memory claims are patentable, so too are the patent claims of the '139.

In Visual Memory it was a memory system with programmable operational characteristics defined by the processor, connected to the memory system, enabling the interoperability for multiple processors.

Similarly, in the '139 the base station is selecting the communication qualities defined by a terminal's connection to a group of base stations, enabling the terminal to calculate the characterizing quantities of the group of base stations to select a very specific base station that is best suited for that device's needs.

We take the position, of course, Your Honor, that there is no need to get to the second step; but even looking at the second step, we believe that the inventions do -- the

inventions of both patents do show an inventive step. The claims of both the '292 and '139 patent add significantly more than alleged abstract idea.

Huawei takes the position that both are nothing more than a combination of conventional elements. However, the claims are directed to novel and inventive combinations of the elements.

As a good case quote that we came up -- that we found here, Your Honor, In re Wright, 843 F.2d 1216:

Virtually all inventions are combinations and every invention is formed of old elements. Only God works with nothing. Man must work with old elements.

In every invention, Your Honor, you are talking about at some level something as conventional that you are using to combine those conventional elements and in some new and non-obvious way to actually come up with something as a new invention.

There are almost no instances, certainly in this day and age, where you are going to find something completely new and non-conventional that is the core of the -- or the entirety of the invention.

The claims pass the second step by solving a problem specific to computers as well. The problems arise in the context of computers. We are talking about mobile devices, essentially, a small computer, if you will. And the

claims both improve on the functionality.

You know, these were little devices, computers, if you will, processors that were determining the position of that device. And they improved on the mechanism of how that device actually uses it, actually determines that position.

The same thing with selecting the base station. They improved on that functionality, and they solved a very discrete problem, which is why the patents are eligible for patentability under 101.

Again, this only gets to the issue of validity and not eligibility. You know, despite raising it as an eligibility attack, Huawei's real argument here is that the asserted claims are obvious. They are saying this combination of conventional elements is put together in a conventional way.

That is at the core of KSR where the Court said:

Simple arrangement of old elements with each performing the same function it made -- it had been known to perform, is a question of obviousness under 103.

That is precisely what the Defendants are arguing here. It is a question of validity. It is premature to be decided on this motion to dismiss.

At a minimum, as we pointed out at the beginning,
Your Honor, the Court should go through the process of claim
construction to specifically determine the scope of the

claims of the '292 and the '139 patent before deciding Huawei's motion to dismiss.

An eligibility analysis turns on whether the claimed invention is outside the scope of the patentable subject matter. That is precisely what the claim construction process does. It determines as a matter of law what the scope of the claims are.

We are at a point now, Your Honor, with two months away, it only makes sense for the parties to argue claim construction and determine what the scope of the claims truly means --

THE COURT: Help me understand, Mr. Fussell, specifically how a claim construction is going to affect the analysis?

MR. FUSSELL: Yes. Looking at the positions -just, for example, here we have in the GPS receiver means
receiving GPS-oriented signals, the Defendants take the
position that this is simply a -- GPS-oriented signals -- I'm
sorry. That is a functionality. The structure -- we agree
on the function. The structure is that the GPS receiver 200
is all that is performing that GPS receiver functionality.

But if -- you know, the Plaintiff's position, which we believe is a correct construction, is that it is more than just that GPS receiver means. It is GPS receiver means, the components within the mobile handset for receiving the

signal. That includes the antenna, the transceiver, and the processor that performs GPS receiving processing, and the corresponding recitations in the specification, which we have cited to here and which are included in our joint claim construction statement.

As we pointed out earlier, Your Honor, one of the guideposts is, is it more -- excuse me. Do the claims require more specific hardware than a general purpose computer?

As our claim construction points out, just that being of one example, these are a number of components within the device that actually require receiving that signal. This is just one of the claim limitations. There are seven means-plus-function limitations that need to be decided by the Court, all of which are comparable and have a similar scope differentiation between the two parties.

But just that alone, just pointing out how there are all these multiple components that actually do the receiving process as described in the specification of the '292 patent, actually, do more than just a generic computer, which is -- or just a generic GPS receiver.

So, obviously, deciding that, Your Honor, on the front end before deciding the motion to dismiss, makes complete sense, in our opinion.

And the same is true for each of the other

1 means-plus-function limitations in the '292 patent. Unless you want me to address the specifics of 2 3 each, I'm happy to take any additional questions, Your 4 Honor. 5 THE COURT: On the claim construction issue, is 6 that what you mean --7 MR. FUSSELL: Yes, sir. THE COURT: -- the specifics? I don't think, 8 9 Mr. Fussell, that is set forth in the briefs, so it would help me if you don't mind going through that. 10 11 The brief, of course, was filed --MR. FUSSELL: Yeah, the briefing was filed before 12 13 the actual -- the parties exchanged claim constructions and filed their joint claim construction statements. 14 15 The positions of the parties taken in the presentation slides here are actually directly taken from the 16 17 joint claim construction statement that has been filed with 18 the Court. 19 Similar to the GPS receiver means, the GPS position calculation means, the parties disagree with the structure 20 that is described in the specification. 21 22 Again, the Defendants argue that the position -the GPS position calculation means is simply the position 23 24 calculation unit GPS 201, GPS block 201, in the specification

and in Figure 2; whereas, we are -- we disclosed that the

25

structure, as required by the specification, is a processor, a position calculation unit, and/or a mobile handset that performs processing functions or their equivalents.

So it is our position, Your Honor, that GPS position calculation means is more than just a simple device. It actually is inclusive of multiple components of the cell phone itself.

THE COURT: Okay. And so tell me, just so I understand, how does that specifically relate to the eligibility question?

MR. FUSSELL: Well, they are saying, Your Honor, that this is just a general purpose computer running a simple math equation and spitting out a result. But it is more than just that.

As the claims require and as proper claim construction will help the Court determine, it is more than just a general purpose computer. It is multiple components within that device actually receiving information, calculating the position, calculating the reliability of that position that was determined, and then a separate component, which is actually combining it.

So more than just a general purpose computer. It is actually multiple components of a device that all are required to actually perform the functionality.

Now, that is not to say that if it is -- if you

agree with their construction, that the patent is not eligible. I am just saying this can help -- determining this full scope may help with the decision from the Court on determining eligibility.

THE COURT: Very well. Okay. And then I guess two other questions. In the '292, the weighted averaging that occurs, is it possible for that to be performed by the human mind?

MR. FUSSELL: I would say it is, yes.

THE COURT: Okay. And then last question --

MR. FUSSELL: But I would actually go back to that because it is not just plugging numbers into that equation that is the invention of the '292 patent because, for example, what if your GPS signal is unreliable? You have no satellites. Therefore, you have a 0 there. Then that reliability calculation is 0, and the cellular position is the only one that is taken into account in determining the position of the device.

So it is more than just plugging in those numbers into an equation. It is just like I pointed out in the Diamond vs. Diehr, there was an equation actually called out in the claims of that patent. And the Courts determined that that was patent eligible because it was a new combination of creating a molding for rubber tires that the inventors came up with, notwithstanding the fact that this arithmetic that

1 had been known to everyone prior to their invention, was 2 capable of being done by hand. It was simple mathematics. 3 THE COURT: Okay. And then, finally, if we were to 4 consider the expert declaration that was filed along with the 5 response, wouldn't we have to convert this to a summary judgment motion? 6 7 MR. FUSSELL: Well, as I mentioned before, Your Honor, we think that this issue is premature. There are 8 9 issues of fact here. So we believe it would need to be converted to a summary judgment motion. 10 11 And we believe that the expert declarations should be taken into account, as they actually point out that these 12 13 were non -- these are experts in the field that point out that, you know, in 2001 for the '292 patent and in 2005 for 14 15 the '139 patent, these were non-conventional combinations of elements that were, in fact, entitled to patentability. 16 17 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Fussell. 18 19 MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, should I start now or --20 THE COURT: How about a short break, just a 21 five-minute break? 22 We will be in recess. 23 (Recess was taken.) 24 THE COURT: Please be seated. 25 Mr. Young.

MR. YOUNG: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor.

I plan to address the various points that Counsel made, pretty much in order.

Mr. Fussell mentioned a claim that we are trying to turn this into a validity issue. We are not. However, what the specification and file history say about the prior art is relevant to the issue under Step 2 of conventionality.

And I will actually quote from this Court's decision in Uniloc vs. Amazon, 16cv570, in a decision issued on March 20, 1990 -- 2017, which is the day before we filed our reply brief. And I think we probably would have quoted this if we had been able.

It is on Page 17 of the Court's decision: A 101 inquiry properly relies on intrinsic evidence concerning the prior art. In the context of determining whether a claim element is known; i.e., so well-known as to be conventional -- conventional, routine, or contained an inventive concept. Although the 101 and 103 inquiries may rely on several tools; i.e., references showing claim elements within the prior art, they are distinct and are treated as such herein.

So our reference, for example, to what the examiner said about the various elements of the '292 patent is highly relevant to the decision as to whether the claims add anything that is not conventional.

As to the '292 patent, Mr. Fussell did go through Figure 1. We are, basically, in agreement actually on what the claims do and what the figures do. It is really the legal characterization on which I believe we greatly disagree.

On the '139 patent, Counsel talked about the advantages allegedly of the grouping and gave an example of how if Safeway is in the group, that that patent can give an advantage.

The problem with that argument is that the claims of the '139 patent actually say nothing at all about how the grouping takes place. It just says there is a grouping. It doesn't tell you about what criteria are used to do the grouping. And for that reason the patent seeks to preempt the basic idea of grouping using any criteria.

And that is one of the reasons why it is an abstract idea lacking an inventive concept and should not be given the status of a patent.

We are not swallowing up the whole of patent law. I think the case law that we cited in our briefs clearly explains why under Electric Power, Digitech, TLS, and similar cases, the particular claims in these patents should not be given the status of patentability. We certainly don't say anything out about other situations.

I would also note that even if there were some

non-preemption, that would not make our argument incorrect. That is, as this Court said in Uniloc, another Uniloc case, versus AVG technologies, in a case that the Court issued a decision on on March 28th, 2017, the day after the last brief in this case -- and that case is 16cv393. That the argument that the scope of preemption is incomplete, is irrelevant because complete preemption is not required under Alice. And the Court there cites 134 S.Ct at 2355.

So the fact that if a claim -- the preemption is not complete, doesn't matter. In any case, at least as to the '292 patent, the attempt at preemption here really is complete as to the use of weighted reliability factors in determining how the information from the GPS and the cellular signals are to be combined.

There is no limitation to that. So if you want to rely on reliability, then under these claims if they are allowed to stand, one would be preempted.

The -- there is no improvement to computer functionality here. The use of a weighted average, the grouping of pieces of information, that is no improvement in computer functionality. That is completely like Enfish and any of the other cases under which patents have been upheld.

Now, Mr. Fussell talked about two recent cases, the Thales and Visual Memory cases. And I want to address both of those. Thales was mentioned briefly in the parties'

briefs, and Visual Memory came out in August and was not mentioned in the briefs.

First, Thales. That case involved a unique and unconventional placement of inertial sensors on various moving objects. It was a physical arrangement that was unique. It did result in some information that would then be mathematically combined. And it was really the physical placement -- and I am looking at Page 9 of the Federal Circuit slip opinion, which the Federal Circuit said: Used inertial sensors in a non-conventional manner to reduce errors in measuring.

Now, there was some calculating involved in that, but I think the key in that case and what distinguishes it from these patents is the physical placement of the sensors which was unique and which was what resulted in the patentable subject matter that the Federal Circuit found in that case.

We don't have any unconventional physical placements of anything here on these patents. The most we have is an alleged novel or unconventional arrangement of information or way of processing information. But the components that collect the information, the components that calculate the information, are all the same. They are just receivers, CPUs, processors. There is nothing unconventional there; and, therefore, the Thales case is not applicable.

In connection with Thales, Mr. Fussell referred to the Diamond vs. Diehr case. And I would point the Court to the discussion in the Alice decision of Diamond vs. Diehr where the Federal Circuit -- actually, it is the Supreme Court. This is the Supreme Court's case in Alice -- said the invention in Diehr used a thermal couple to record constant temperature measurements, something that the industry had not been able to obtain.

So there is a distinction there that is not present in this case. There is no new physical component of any sort in this case. It is just using existing generic computing components to calculate information in a way that is allegedly different.

With respect to the more recent Visual Memory case,

I think that there is some relevant information there that we
need to consider. That case involved a memory system with
programmable characteristics that were tailored for use with
different processors.

In addition, the claims there utilized cache memory differently depending on the type of processor that was being used. So what you ended up with was an improved memory system that constituted a technological improvement that you don't have in this case. You don't have a set of components that is unconventional.

You don't have a set of components that is

unconventional. You don't have memory components that are being used differently depending on the kind of processor that is being used. That is -- those are, for one, they are physical components. They are not simply conventional processing units or receivers.

And, two, there are arranged in a way and operate in a way that leads to an improved memory system rather than an abstract idea, which is what had been alleged in that case. So it is a very different case.

I agree with Mr. Fussell that man must work with old elements. However, if the old elements are abstract ideas under Alice and in Section 101, they are not patentable.

Certainly, there are plenty of cases with old elements that are combined in new ways, and Visual Memory is one of those, for example. But this is not a case where the old elements that we are dealing with are of the kind that lead to patentability.

Here, anything that is new is simply in the arrangement of information in the way the information is calculated. There is nothing new about the things that are used to do that calculation. And for that reason, there is no inventive step.

Now, Mr. Fussell also talked about the claim construction issue, and I don't have a slide on it, but the

particular elements that he focused on related to, I believe, the '139 patent.

And in those cases where -- simply we have a disagreement on the claim construction. We say that the corresponding elements are the figures in the diagram. They say that, yes, that is included, but it also includes antennae, transceivers, and processors. That actually helps our case on the 101 issue. Antennae, transceivers and processors are all generic components. They are all being used in the same way they have always been used, to receive information, to process the information.

The processing is allegedly different and unique, but the acts that are performed by those components are conventional generic acts. It is not like Thales where you had sensors that are actually placed in a new unconventional way. Those physical components that Hitachi Maxwell alleges are part of the claimed elements here, are actually being used in their conventional, generic way.

Now, Mr. Fussell, as to the '292 patent, gave us an example of how the combination might work if GPS, say, is unreliable. And he talked about how one of those factors could be given a 0 weight.

We do have a disagreement on the claim construction here. He said it is actually not used in the claim. We believe that it is because Figure 3 actually still has it as

part of the equation, the weighted average in the equation. It does mean, though, if there is a 0 reliability, the math is easier because you end up with 0 in some of those places in the equation.

But it is still used, and it simply emphasizes our point, which is that if the math is easier it becomes even more easy for someone to do that on paper with a pen.

Your Honor asked a question about the procedural aspect of this if the Court were to choose to consider the expert declarations in this case. We do believe as a procedural matter that it would become a summary judgment motion, and we would move the Court if -- in that instance for summary judgment on the record that exists now.

There is a practical reason why an earlier decision on the 101 issue would be helpful. We are about to start claim construction briefing. There are 32 claims at issue, many of the claim elements at issue.

There are many elements that are in the '292 patent which Plaintiff wants to construe because they are means-plus-function elements. We believe that even under their construction we should prevail; that these patents are not patentable subject matter; and the claim construction proceedings would actually be significantly facilitated, and the proceeding would be made much easier if this motion were to be granted, as it should.

Unless Your Honor has further questions, thank you very much. THE COURT: I don't. Thank you, Mr. Young. Mr. Fussell, any short response? MR. FUSSELL: Just quickly, Your Honor. Just to that last point, Your Honor, I thought that I previously heard Mr. Young say that they would agree to our constructions; therefore, that certainly facilitates the claim construction process. I say that tongue-in-cheek. I'm sorry. THE COURT: I understood Mr. Fussell. MR. FUSSELL: Just to sort of back this up and highlight or take this to a higher level, Your Honor. That

MR. FUSSELL: Just to sort of back this up and highlight or take this to a higher level, Your Honor. That is, what they are asking you to do here is, essentially negate our patents, say it is not patentable under 101, and kick these patents out before ever having claim construction and determining the proper scope of the claims, which we believe is important to the process here, specifically, but also before we even consider experts and the facts at issue in the case. And we have expert declarations that actually point out that these are experts in the field that actually have stated in their declarations these are non-conventional combinations of -- you know, of these elements, which actually is what the invention is in this case.

You know, they are saying that these are

conventional elements combined in a non -- in a conventional way. And we have expert declarations saying that they aren't actually that. You know, I think that is a fact issue that should be considered by the Court and decided with the full facts before the Court before deciding these issues. Either that, or as the Court proposed earlier, converting this to a summary judgment motion. We have no objection to that as well.

Just quickly on some of the points raised. With respect to the Thales case, he points out that the placement of the sensors was unique. But the placement of the sensors were just doing what they are conventionally meant to do, and that is, determine the position and orientation of one device compared to the position and orientation of another device.

And what they did was take those two conventional elements to determine the position and orientation of one and the position and orientation of the other and combine the two instead of just determining the position and orientation with respect to the earth itself.

Now, I don't see how that is so different than what we have done here. We are taking some arguably conventional devices, GPS receivers and cellular receivers, and combining the information in there after determining their reliability and producing an estimate of the position of the device. It is doing something in a non-conventional way, which is

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

exactly what the invention in the Thales case was describing as well. So I think that clearly supports our position and even their position on that as well. I believe that was all I had unless you have some questions for us. THE COURT: I don't. Thank you, Mr. Fussell. MR. FUSSELL: Thank you. THE COURT: Mr. Young, this is your motion. Do you want to have the last word? MR. YOUNG: Well, Your Honor, thank you very much for your indulgence. Actually, I had two points. One,

because I wasn't sure we completely heard.

We certainly do disagree on the claim construction I think some of us are chuckling here. So, obviously, we would agree for the purposes of this 101 motion, if that would facilitate the Court's ruling. But we certainly disagree on the substance of the claim construction.

The other issue, and this is a new point, and I certainly would want Mr. Fussell to have a chance to address this, is that he said in his remarks earlier that these claims are more than taking the information, processing it, and spitting out a result.

I am actually not so sure that that is right. don't know that anything is done in these claims other than

spitting out a result. The '139 claim is actually on the screen in front of the Court. It talks about the third step of specifying one of the plurality of groups, and then it talks about selecting one of the base stations within the specified group.

So it actually gets an answer. It tells you which base station is selected. But then it doesn't do anything with that. So, basically, at the end of the process you end up with an answer as a result of all this information processing, and that is it. You just get the answer.

The '292 claim is similar. What you do at the end of Method Claim 2 is you output a combined position that takes into account all of the processing that has taken place. But that's it. You just end with an answer, which is an X and Y coordinate. I do think it is just a spitting out of the results.

Now, even if it were more than that, it wouldn't determine the issue because you would still have the Alice Step 2 that I think you are just taking information in, processing it, and getting information out. And that is really all you are doing with these claims.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Very well. Thank you, Mr. Young.
Mr. Fussell, do you want to respond to that?

MR. FUSSELL: I would just comment, Your Honor,

that, you know, this is exactly how -- what we pointed out in the opening and in the briefing is that his point is the point that we made earlier is that they are just stripping down the claims to abstraction, which you can do, and as the Court warned in Alice, you can do with any claims. And that is all he is doing here.

THE COURT: Thank you. All right.

All right. Well, very well. I appreciate the parties being here and the excellent presentations this afternoon. We are coming up on claim construction briefing and practice. I think this motion was fully briefed some time ago. And to the extent there was a delay in getting this set for a hearing, my apologies for that. We are usually better about doing that.

And in all candor, I have to tell you the next couple of months for us are really busy. We will endeavor to get an order out on this as quickly as we can. But we do have a number of trials set both here in Texarkana and in Tyler over the next six weeks.

So I have learned my lesson about making promises about when orders will come out. But I do -- I do assure you we will get it out as quickly as we possibly can.

So unless the parties have anything else, we will be in recess. Safe travels to y'all.

(Hearing adjourned.)

CERTIFICATION I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript from the stenographic notes of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter to the best of my ability. October 2, 2017 /s/ Shea Sloan SHEA SLOAN, CSR, RPR Official Court Reporter State of Texas No.: 3081 Expiration Date: 12/31/18